Posted by
F1etch on Monday, December 01, 2008 8:42:18 AM
Chapter Four: Ridicule for Regulations
Your tax dollars at work:
The [National Fluid Milk Processor Promotion] Board shall have the following powers:
(a) To receive and evaluate, or on its own initiative develop, and budget for plans or projects to educate consumers and promote the use of fluid milk products and to make recommendations to the Secretary regarding such proposals;
(b) To administer the provisions of this subpart in accordance with its terms and provisions;
(c) To make rules and regulations to effectuate the terms and provisions of this subpart;
(d) To receive, investigate, and report to the Secretary complaints of violations of the provisions of this subpart;
(e) To employ such persons as the Board deems necessary and determine the duties and compensation of such persons;
(f) To contract with eligible organizations or other persons to conduct activities authorized pursuant to this subpart;
(g) To select committees and subcommittees, to adopt bylaws, and to adopt such rules for the conduct of its business as it may deem advisable; the Board may establish working committees of persons other than Board members;
(h) To recommend to the Secretary amendments to this subpart; and
(i) With the approval of the Secretary, to invest, pending disbursement pursuant to a plan or project, funds collected through assessments authorized under §1160.211 in, and only in, obligations of the United States or any agency thereof, in general obligations of any State or any political subdivision thereof, in any interest-bearing account or certificate of deposit of a bank that is a member of the Federal Reserve System, or in obligations fully guaranteed as to principal and interest by the United States.
[58 FR 62503, Nov. 29, 1993, as amended at 63 FR 46639, Sept. 2, 1998]
§ 1160.209 Duties of the Board.
The Board shall have the following duties:
(a) To meet not less than annually, and to organize and select from among its members a chairperson, who may serve for a term of a fiscal period pursuant to §1160.113, and not more than two consecutive terms, and to select such other officers as may be necessary;
(b) To prepare and submit to the Secretary for approval a budget for each fiscal period of the anticipated expenses and disbursements in the administration of this subpart, including a description of and the probable costs of consumer education, promotion and research projects;
(c) To develop and submit to the Secretary for approval promotion and consumer education, and research plans or projects;
(d) To the extent practicable, carry out consumer education and promotion programs under §1160.301 in such a manner as to ensure that advertising coverage in each of the regions defined in §1160.200 is proportionate to funds collected from each such region;
(e) To disseminate information to fluid milk processors or eligible organizations;
(f) To maintain minutes, books and records that accurately reflect all of the acts and transactions of the Board, which shall be available to the Secretary for inspection and audit, and prepare and promptly report minutes of each Board meeting to the Secretary and submit such reports from time to time to the Secretary as the Secretary may prescribe, and to account with respect to the receipt and disbursement of all funds entrusted to it;
(g) To enter into contracts or agreements, with the approval of the Secretary, with such persons and organizations as the Board may approve for the development and conduct of activities authorized under this subpart and for the payment of the cost thereof with funds collected through assessments pursuant to §1160.211 and income from such assessments. Any such contract or agreement shall provide that:
(1) The contractors shall develop and submit to the Board a plan or project together with a budget(s) showing the estimated cost of such plan or project;
(2) Any such plan or project shall be adopted upon approval of the Secretary; and
(3) The contracting party shall keep accurate records of all of its transactions and make periodic reports to the Board of all activities conducted pursuant to the contract or agreement, and provide accounts of all funds received and expended, and such other reports as the Secretary or the Board may require. The Secretary or employees of the Board periodically may audit the records of the contracting parties;
(h) For the initial fiscal period, the Board shall contract, to the extent practicable and subject to the approval of the Secretary, with an eligible organization to carry out the provisions of this subpart;
(i) To prepare and make public, at least annually, a report of its activities and an accounting for funds received and expended;
(j) To have an audit of its financial statements conducted by a certified public accountant in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, at the end of the first 15 months of the initial fiscal period, at the end of the initial fiscal period, and at least once each fiscal period thereafter as well as at such other times as the Secretary may request, and to submit a copy of each such audit report to the Secretary;
(k) To give the Secretary the same notice of meetings of the Board and committees of the Board, including actions conducted under §1160.206(b), as is given to such Board or committee members in order that the Secretary, or a representative of the Secretary, may attend such meetings;
(l) To submit to the Secretary such information pursuant to this subpart as may be requested;
(m) The Board shall take reasonable steps to coordinate the collection of assessments, and promotion, education, and research activities of the Board, with the National Dairy Promotion and Research Board established under section 113(b) of the Dairy Production Stabilization Act of 1983 (7 U.S.C. 4504(b)); and
(n) The Board shall conduct advertising using third parties only through contracts which shall prohibit the third party from selling, offering for sale, or otherwise making available advertising time or space to private industry members conducting brand-name advertising which immediately precedes, follows, appears in juxtaposition, or appears in the midst of Board-sponsored advertising.
[58 FR 62503, Nov. 29, 1993, as amended at 61 FR 27003, May 30, 1996; 62 FR 3983, Jan. 28, 1997] [1]
That is but a very small part of the regulation – brought to you as another disastrous offering of the New Deal - that establishes a 20-member panel empowered to use federal resources in order to undertake “public relations, advertising or other means devoted to educating consumers about the desirable characteristics of fluid milk products and directed toward increasing the general demand for fluid milk products”. In other words, it uses your tax dollars to tell people that milk – except, apparently, for that nasty powdered kind – is “good for you.” Maybe if the price of milk were not subsidized to the tune of $4 billion in taxpayer dollars per year such a program might not be necessary.
The second “pillar” of the modern democratic state, we are told, is regulation and the forces of the “anti-government campaign” are supposedly conspiring at this very moment to ensure that evil businessmen can slash your wages, poison your water, contaminate your food and sell you shoddy medicines. Without the ever-vigilant, ever-benevolent government, no doubt everyone’s front yard would be a toxic landfill and no one would live to adulthood. In the face of that belief, one is faced with the inevitable question: can anyone really be that stupid?
Those who defend the ever-expanding encroachment of governmental regulation into our daily lives operate from a specific set of conclusions. First, it is government action, and government action alone, that prevents businesses from taking advantage of workers, customers and the general public. Second, governmental concerns are more benevolent than are those of businesses and are, therefore, more capable of protecting the safety and security of the public. And third, the “anti-government” forces want to eliminate essentially every protection that has ever been put in place.
Let’s deal with the last absurdity, first. Obviously, no one is seeking to eliminate all law. Even modern anarchist thought does not envision this outcome, instead seeking to replace the government legal system with a private alternative. It is disingenuous at best to suggest that the effort to limit the expansive regulatory actions of government is essentially an effort to undermine or destroy all societal order. Such a societal order is predicated upon the protection of the individual from infringement upon his rights and property by the actions of others. It is neither necessary nor advisable to codify into law every possible circumstance that could result in harm. Quoth the Roman sage, “A corrupt society has many laws.” [2]
The problem, as much as anything else, is a large group of lawmakers that have way too much time on their hands. Since the dawn of civilization we have progressed from ”Thou shalt not kill” to “Thou shalt not, except as otherwise provided in this article, willfully mar, mutilate, deface, disfigure, or injure beyond normal use any rocks, trees, shrubbery, wild flowers, or other features of the natural environment in recreation areas of the state of Colorado” and “Though shalt not wear roller skates in a public lavatory in Portland, Oregon”. And, of course, there’s the Internal Revenue Code of the United States, the longest and most complicated statute ever devised by the mind of Man, containing more than 3.4 million words and, if printed out in its entirety, more than capable of removing from the gene pool anyone foolish enough to be under the table it is placed upon.
Between these two extremes of straightforward laws against willfully injuring others and examples of outright legislative stupidity, rests that body of regulation that some view either as a model of success or worse, if anything, insufficient (minimum wage laws, banking regulation, the SEC, the EPA, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, OSHA), but, in reality are not the benevolent protections that some would have you believe.
Quite often, the state creates laws that penalize perceived harm that is not really an infringement of any kind. Worse still, very often laws and regulations are written that, rather than acting in a protective capacity, attempt to impose a positive duty upon some party. One example of this is the minimum wage. The notion that this particular regulation is effective as an anti-poverty measure has already been disposed of and that the consequences of such laws is the destruction of jobs has been well established. But just as the argument for public charity is based on the premise that doom awaits the poor without state intervention, so, too, it is argued that unscrupulous businessmen will “stick it” to the working man without such intervention. This premise is no less silly than the last.
Businesses are created by human beings. They, like everyone else, invariably act in what they perceive to be their own best interests. If their perceptions are correct, they will reap the benefits of their decisions; if their perceptions are wrong, they will suffer the consequences. Thus, it is fair to say that the one characteristic that distinguishes successful businessmen from the rest of society is not that they are greedier or more ruthless but simply that their perceptions have proven correct more frequently than those who have not been, on balance, successful.
Businesses are created for the express purpose of making the investors in those business activities better off. They are not beneficent societies designed to help the working man but, in fact, that is exactly what they achieve. Every employment opportunity ever created in the marketplace came into being as an opportunity for the investors in any given business activity to generate a greater return. This is the “invisible hand” of Adam Smith at work. The direct intended consequence is the betterment of the investor. The inevitable unintended consequence is the creation of opportunity for the worker to engage in a productive activity and better his own circumstances.
It has been posited that the businessman will pay as little as possible for that newly created job. This much is true. It has also been posited that such a situation results in the worker being paid “starvation wages”, or perhaps even less, unless some legal minimum is established. This is absurd on its face. There are two fallacies behind such a belief. First, because the employer has the final say with regard to any one employment opportunity, it is assumed that the employer has “all the power”. This is nonsensical. In reality, in a competitive labor market such as we have in the United States, the employer that fails to compensate employees at market rates will lose them to his competitors forcing him to incur higher turnover and greater costs. Thus, the employer that sets out deliberately to harm his employees is acting against his own interests. Any theory that requires people to act in such a manner must be instantly discarded as unworkable.
To this logical argument can be added a whole host of empirical evidence. If the “unscrupulous businessman” theory carried any weight, then, by definition, entry-level wages would never exceed the legal minimum; wages on the whole, particularly for low-skill positions, would likewise remain at or near the legal minimum and would stagnate, rising only slightly over time. All of the empirical evidence indicates exactly the opposite. The current national minimum wage is $6.55/hr. But entry-level positions throughout the US routinely offer more than that level. It is nearly impossible to pass a fast food franchise in the northeast corridor offering less than $8 or $9/hr. The median expected salary for a typical fast food cook is $17,492, [3] which equates to about $8.75/hr
But that’s just one example, and not the only one that has been touched on already. At least some of the detrimental implications of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) appear in the introduction to this thesis. There are more than can be addressed in a single volume. There are, however, two points to be made. First is that so many of the regulations that have been touted as “successes” have, in fact, been no such thing. And second is that the unhindered preying upon the public that is presumed to take place in the absence of the crushing state regulatory apparatus is entirely fanciful.
Successful Regulation? Don’t Bank On It
Another example concerns banking regulations, significant contributors to the Great Depression, to the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s and of the mortgage and liquidity crisis of 2008. Events that are all too often characterized as failures of the market or of capitalism turn out to be failures of government policies and regulation. These three particular financial crises are particularly of note because, beyond monetary policy failures, persistent (and, as it happens, sequential) failures of regulation played a material role in their development.
The commonly repeated story is that the Great Depression was a failure of capitalism and that so many banks failed because they were invested in the stock market when it crashed and depositors swarmed the banks to get money that was no longer there. [4] The reality is quite different. During the 1930s, some 9,000 banks failed but 90 percent of these were in small towns and nearly all of them were located in states with unit banking laws. [5]
Unit banking laws restrict the ability of banks to open multiple branches particularly in disparate states. Thus constrained, banks in the 1930s were faced with a serious dilemma. Prohibited by law from diversifying geographically and, to a large extent, financially, the small state banks constrained by these laws found themselves trapped in locations particularly hard hit by the Depression. If any area were faced with economic hardship, depositors began demanding their money at the very time that their loan portfolios – concentrated in the same troubled location – were proving to be impaired. While most unit banking laws were put in place at the state level, federally chartered banks were made equally vulnerable by … you guessed it … additional regulation. The McFadden Act of 1927 permitted the individual states to place the same type of branching restrictions on Federal Reserve member banks. Meanwhile, the larger, more diversified banks not only didn’t experience the runs and failures that restricted banks did, but were vocally resistant to the institution of federal deposit insurance because their banking organizations remained financially sound.
Had legislators been paying attention, they might have foreseen the crisis coming and placed the blame at the feet of the Federal Reserve System, where it belonged. Ludwig von Mises famously said in 1929, “A great crash is coming, and I don’t want my name in any way connected with it”, when turning down a position at the Kreditanstalt Bank. [6] And Friedrich A. Hayek wrote in early that year “the boom will collapse within the next few months.” [7] But legislators are simply not known for their ability to pay attention.
In its infinite wisdom, the government solution to the banking crisis of the Great Depression was to pass the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932 and the Banking Act of 1933, otherwise known as the Glass-Steagall Act. These Acts accomplished four things: it gave the Federal Reserve system materially more power particularly with regard to the regulation of rates for depository instruments; it reaffirmed the McFadden Act restrictions upon interstate banking; it created new distinctions between commercial, investment and mortgage banking; and it created federal deposit insurance through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). This pinnacle of reactive legislation is a perfect example of just how bad regulation can be.
The first two consequences of the act are particularly noteworthy. Under the pretext of protecting the general public from further bank failures, it gave more power to the very government body that was the chief cause of the Depression as a whole and then reasserted the very rule that was the primary cause of so many bank failures. As a result, banks were still unable to diversify geographically, certainly ensuring that still more banks would fail and they now had additional interference from federal regulators in an area – deposit pricing – that had absolutely nothing to do with either the Depression or the failure of banks. Not exactly an auspicious beginning.
Contrary to popular belief, the other two provisions of the act were even more disastrous. The artificial barriers placed between various banking functions were instituted based upon the belief that the cause of the financial crisis was investment banking exposure when the stock markets tumbled. But the belief has proved to be entirely false. No evidence exists that any of the thousands of small banks that failed across the country collapsed due to investment exposure and it was the large banks that engaged in investment banking activities that proved most resilient to the crisis and survived. So, the most benign way to look at this particular regulatory action is that it did nothing to address any real problem. The implications of this legislation, while immediate in their effect, would take decades to really do obvious damage.
The savings and loan (S&L) crisis of the 1980s is, inevitably, described as a failure of government to properly regulate the industry. This view is pure mythology. In reality, the problem was backward regulation and then poorly developed partial deregulation that combined to create and, ultimately, exacerbate the problem. Let’s look at what really happened.
Prior to the Depression years, mortgage lending was primarily a function of insurance companies – who had large sums to invest for the long term – and larger commercial banks. In the wake of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, however, savings and loan associations sprang up all over the country, in no small part because of the low cost funds made available to them by the federal government from the Federal Home Loan Bank. These institutions took in savings deposits, often from small depositors, and created long-term mortgage loans for homebuyers. The basic problem with that arrangement was made abundantly clear – at least to those paying attention – in the movie, It’s a Wonderful Life, when the frightened depositors of Bedford Falls came looking for their money. Our hero, George Bailey (Jimmy Stewart) tells a Building and Loan customer, “The money's not here. Your money's in Joe's house... And in the Kennedy house, and Mrs. Macklin's house, and a hundred others. Why, you're lending them the money to build, and then, they're going to pay it back to you as best they can…. We've got to have faith in each other.”
When there is such a tremendous mismatch between the ability of the depositor to withdraw his money and the ability of the lending institution to retrieve those funds from where they are invested, the only thing holding the institution up is “faith”. In a further effort to distinguish these institutions from commercial banks, the savings and loans were, on the one hand, permitted to offer higher interest rates for deposits but, on the other, were prohibited from offering checking accounts. Maintaining these entirely artificial distinctions between businesses in the financial services industry set the stage for ultimate failure.
So long as interest rates remained relatively low, the house of cards seemed to be holding up fairly well. All that changed in the late 1960s. By the end of 1965, a one-month CD could get you 4.8 percent, [8] making this very-liquid investment extremely attractive to those who had sizable deposits in the savings and loans. Three years later, this rate had climbed to 6.2 percent. By the mid-1970, it peaked at 8.0 percent and the savings and loans were in serious trouble, but, much to their relief, rates fell rapidly over the next eight months and disaster was averted. Something might have been done then to prevent the crisis from recurring, but the opportunity was lost.
By mid-1973, rates were once more approaching eight percent and the S&Ls were once again in trouble. Deposits were fleeing to find more lucrative investments while assets continued to be tied up in long-term mortgages. Rates would climb to 12.2 percent (in 1974) before reform was considered and would not be enacted until 1980. By the time rates hit 16.8 percent in March of 1980, the savings and loan industry was already dead; it just wasn’t well known yet.
No amount of short-term liquidity provided through the Federal Home Loan Bank could possibly reconcile the difference between short and long term interest rates that were responsible for the demise of these institutions. This, of course, did not prevent an interventionist government from trying. In 1980, Congress passed the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA). [9] This Act did nothing to forestall the problems and, in many ways, made them worse. The Act forced all banks and S&Ls to abide by Federal Reserve rules, often while still other rules remained in effect, complicating still further the management of these lenders. It permitted savings and loans to offer checking accounts. This made S&Ls more attractive as a single banking source on the one-hand but any deposits were attracted as a result were even more subject to rapid withdrawal. It raised the deposit insurance level for US banks from $40,000 to $100,000, which might elicit a sarcastic comment about how successful this was at saving S&Ls but I’ll come back to deposit insurance shortly. And it allowed banks to merge, which, at least, permitted more financially sound financial institutions to acquire the assets of certain S&Ls before the taxpayers had to foot the bill.
The Act had one other significant consequence: it deregulated interest rates, removing the power to cap interest rates from the Federal Reserve Board. In ordinary circumstances, this likely would have been a boon to the industry. But circumstances were far from ordinary. In an attempt to save businesses that were often already doomed, many S&Ls began offering progressively higher rates in order to attract deposits while investing in ever more risky mortgages in order to cover the higher deposit costs. The death spiral had begun.
In 1982, the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act [10] was passed. It allowed thrift institutions to invest in commercial loans, initially up to 5 percent of total assets and eventually 10 percent and increased the level of assets that could be invested in consumer and commercial real estate loans. Again, these measures might well have helped the industry better compete in an ordinary environment (they truly might have been a “jackpot” [11] in a typical rate environment), but the damage had already been done. The chief cause of the problem was low net worth in the S&Ls, seriously impaired by the interest rate environment before the decade had begun and “[p]ressures felt by the management of many associations to restore net worth ratios. Anxious to improve earnings, they departed from their traditional lending practices into credits and markets involving higher risks, but with which they had little experience.” [12] These problems, not fraud, were the cause of 80 percent of the failures in the industry and they stemmed not from deregulation (which came later) but the initial regulations that created these entities in the first place.
The inevitable result: over the decade ending in 1995, the number of federally insured savings and loans in this country declined by half. Apparently not satisfied that it had done enough damage in the financial sector up to this point, the federal government chose to intervene still further. In 1989, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) [13] was passed. As a result, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation were abolished, effectively – if you’ll forgive the mixed metaphor - closing the barn door long after the barn had burned down. These were replaced by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), the Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB) and the Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIC) which, again, did nothing to address the underlying problems in the business. And the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), a political football if ever there was one, was created to help dispose of the assets taken over by regulators with the taxpayer footing the bill.
This Act also had one other significant consequence: it gave both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac considerably more responsibility to “support” mortgages for ever more low and moderate-income families. Unlike the initial Depression-era legislation, this did not take four decades to wreck serious havoc on the financial markets. It took less than two, as the events of 2008 bear out with alarming clarity. No wonder Adam Smith once opined: “To be merely useless is perhaps the highest eulogy which can ever justly be bestowed upon a regulated company.” [14]
The artificial distinction between commercial banks and investment banks was no less destructive. This aspect of the Glass-Steagall legislation was created based upon the widely-held assumption that bank participation in the securities markets at the time of the 1929 crash was a major factor in the demise of American banks. The presumption, however, was completely without basis. The major causes of bank failures during the Depression have already been discussed and securities problems were not among them. In fact, in only one case, the failure of the Bank of the United States in 1930, was the securities operation of a bank cited as the proximate cause of the failure and, in that case, the failure was “due less to the operations of the bank’s securities affiliate per se than to inept management and outright fraud”. [15] The evidence is pretty clear that securities affiliates were not a major cause of bank failures in the thirties. This did not prevent Senator Glass, co-sponsor of the legislation from declaring, “These affiliates, I repeat, were the most unscrupulous contributors, next to the debauch of the New York Stock Exchange, to the financial catastrophe which visited this country and was mainly responsible for the depression under which we have been suffering since.” [16]
That no other country in the world created such distinctions, despite the global impact of the Depression, should be revealing in and of itself. As a consequence, US banks suffered a very real competitive disadvantage in relation to other international financial institutions which was not terribly damaging in the thirties but became ever more so as the economy evolved to a more global footing. By the 1980s, as individuals could use the internet to seek financial services and investment opportunities essentially anywhere in the world, the maintenance of such artificial distinctions became obviously archaic.
Inevitably, these distinctions were effectively eliminated through a process known as “regulatory arbitrage” by which, in order to remain competitive in the global marketplace, banks, insurance companies and investment houses, through holding companies and other avenues created legal, but often costly, methods of working around obsolete regulations in order to meet customer needs. The costs associated with this practice over several decades are incalculable, but the economic costs to the country are likely far higher as a result of capital flows seeking better returns overseas. Fortunately, much of this artificial distinction was eliminated under the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 – otherwise known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. [17] Unfortunately, the effect of this Act, coupled with a tendency of government to socialize the losses in the financial services industry, would result in still more problems. [18]
But you simply can’t find fault with the institution of federal deposit insurance that protects depositors and prevents runs on banks, can you? Actually, the benefits of deposit insurance are largely illusory, but the benefit of deposit insurance is not the only myth related to this particular type of intervention.
Perhaps the greatest misconceptions about deposit insurance relate to its inception. It is widely believed the FDIC was created to protect depositors because so many of them lost their savings as banks failed; that banks were eager for the measure and that it ended runs on the banks ending a disastrous trend and restoring faith in the financial system. Every one of those beliefs is false.
In reality, deposit insurance was created to protect banks, not depositors. More importantly, while runs on the banks were perhaps the most visible symptom of the banking crisis, they were not the primary cause for those failures. In the years before the Great Depression, unit banking laws made it difficult, if not impossible, to engage in branch banking with multiple diversified locations to meet customer needs. This not only made individual banks vulnerable to any downturn in the local economy, it also created conditions in which the only way many local needs could be met was with the creation of new banks where otherwise a new branch for an existing bank might have filled the need. This, combined with low reserve requirements in a fractional reserve banking system made it both advantageous to local communities to find someone willing to open a new bank and relatively easy to do with a minimum of invested capital. As a result, the number of banks in the United States exploded.
The number of banks had grown to about 2,500 by the early 1870s; by 1887, that figure had nearly doubled; by the turn of the century, it exceeded 12,000; and by the time it peaked before the Depression, there were more than 30,000 individual banks in operation, the vast majority of which were small, local, undercapitalized operations. “Many of the new banks were viewed by commentators as being ill-prepared for the business of banking. In other words, too many banks were formed without adequate financial or managerial resources. The banking market was overbanked.” [19] And all of this stemmed from a need to meet consumer demand that regulations prevented from being addressed in an economically sound manner. Research indicates that the majority of the banks that failed were weak and likely to fail regardless of runs. [20]
Might some of the failures of those banks been avoided if there had been deposit insurance? Not a chance. Quite the contrary, one of the factors contributing to rapid rise in the number of new banks was precisely that. “The formation of state deposit insurance systems in a number of states may also have contributed to a perception of safety and allowed the rapid growth of new small banks.” [19]
Three other flaws with the theory that deposit insurance was needed because of depositor losses stemming from bank runs exist. The first is that depositors really did not experience the huge losses that many now believe were endemic to the period. In fact, “from 1875 through 1933, losses from failures averaged only 0.2 percent of total deposits in the banking system annually. Losses to depositors at failed banks averaged only a fraction of the annual losses suffered by bondholders of failed nonbanking firms.” [21]
The second is that runs are rarely the proximate cause of bank failure. “The danger of bank runs has been frequently overstated. For one thing, a bank run is unlikely to cause insolvency. Suppose that depositors, worried about their bank’s solvency, start a run and switch their deposits to other banks. If their concerns about the bank’s solvency are unjustified, other banks in the same market area will generally gain from recycling funds they receive back to the bank experiencing the run. They would do this by making loans to the bank or by purchasing the bank’s assets at non-fire-sale prices. Thus, a run is highly unlikely to make a solvent bank insolvent…. A survey of all failures of national banks from 1865 through 1936 by J. F. T. O’Connor, comptroller of the currency from 1933 through 1938, concluded that runs were a contributing cause in less than 15 percent of the three thousand failures. The fact that the number of runs on individual banks was far greater than this means that most runs did not lead to failures.” [21]
And the third is that the bank runs were not so much the result of bank weakness as they were of still another regulatory failure. “The panic of 1933 is a special case, and was caused by the unprecedented resort of state banking officials to the declaration of bank holidays and the resulting uncertainty for depositors, who rushed to withdraw funds before their own banks were closed. Bank failures, although still at a high level, had declined and there was reason to hope for a return to stability when the Governor of Michigan declared a bank holiday on February 14 to protect the Guardian Group (Ford family) of Banks. This led to holidays in other states as Michigan (then Indiana and Ohio, then Illinois and Pennsylvania, etc.) depositors sought cash elsewhere until by the time Franklin Roosevelt was inaugurated on March 4 banks in all forty-eight states had either been closed or restrictions had been placed on their deposits. Although national in scope, the panic of 1933 was due less to depositors' fears of bank insolvency than to the actions of public officials.” [22]
It has, of course, been argued that the implementation of deposit insurance brought the bank runs and related closures to an end, but there are major problems with that assertion. First, as we have seen, the vast majority of bank failures were the result of problems completely unaddressed by deposit insurance. Second, by the time the FDIC was created, nearly a third of the country’s banks, obviously including those most financially vulnerable, had already disappeared. That trend could not continue forever. And third, in 1934 – the damage of the new administration’s economic policies and the “Roosevelt recession” of 1937-1938 still far in the future – the economy took a turn for the better. Economic output in 1934 rose sharply after four years of decline, relieving much of the pressure on surviving banks
There was one reason why the institution of federal deposit insurance did perhaps help halt the trend of bank failures, though it is debatable whether this particular benefit outweighed the negative consequences. In modern parlance, it is called ‘corporate welfare”. By socializing any losses on accounts of less than $2,500 (and now the bar has been raised far higher) it both eliminated any business risk for banks to engage in risky behavior with those deposits and undermined the natural incentive for people to pay attention to the condition of their bank and, if prudent, move their money elsewhere before there is a problem. This activity, long before anything resembling a “run” took place, had been a key warning sign to regulators if the bank were to be facing serious difficulties. This canary-in-the-mine-shaft was now gone. Worse still, the program assessed premiums for this insurance not based upon risk, but, instead, based solely on deposit levels. This served to reward risky and irresponsible behavior among riskier banks while penalizing those banks that had engaged in more responsible practices.
“FDIC insurance provided a significant profit-boosting subsidy to the riskiest banks. With the government backing their deposits, in 1934 all banks could suddenly gather deposits at the risk-free interest rate. Those banks that might have failed in the near future—the riskiest banks—benefited most. Unless depositors were completely oblivious to their bank’s health, in the absence of deposit insurance, such banks would have had to pay depositors high interest rates. Had the FDIC charged risk-adjusted deposit insurance [premiums], the riskiest banks would have enjoyed no benefit. But [premiums] were calculated as a simple percentage of deposits. Therefore, troubled banks enjoyed a sudden boost in their profits due to the introduction of FDIC insurance. Failures would naturally be minimized, not because contagion was halted, but instead because FDIC insurance provided a subsidy to those banks most likely to fail.” [19]
This is not just some minor phenomenon that resolved itself in a short time span. A revealing anecdote concerns a mid-Atlantic bank with which I am personally very familiar. This bank is heavily involved in home equity lending but adhered to very strict underwriting criteria. As a result, this bank, while experiencing some losses in its investment portfolio, did not have any sub-prime loans on its books and, as of this writing, was experiencing loan losses that were still lower than the industry average before the onset of the mortgage lending crisis. How was this greater discipline rewarded? The Fed has indicated that deposit insurance premiums for this institution will increase roughly eight-fold in 2009. [23]
This is called a “moral hazard”, a condition in which a party is likely to behave differently, perhaps rashly, if he is insulated from risk, typically by means of insurance or implicit guarantee – as was the case with regard to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 2008 – such that the party does not bear the full consequences of his actions. In the marketplace, the risk of moral hazard associated with ordinary insurance – one might be a less careful driver because of automobile coverage – is typically mitigated by risk-based pricing. In the case of deposit insurance, there are actually two distinct types of moral hazard at work simultaneously. First, because the risk of loss to banks is not risk-priced, there is no disincentive for the bank to engage in risky behavior in order to achieve a greater return. Second, because the depositor incurs none of the cost directly (though the cost of premiums reduces the deposit rates offered to consumers), there is no incentive to monitor the performance of the institution holding their money so long as the balances do not exceed the insured threshold.
Studies show that, in the unhindered marketplace, there is a “strong link between bank fundamentals and the supply of deposits, consistent with the hypothesis that market discipline is at work [and] that an increase in bank risk leads to higher interest rates and lower deposits. The results also suggest that most of the market discipline comes from large depositors. Nevertheless, “small” depositors, with at least $5,000 to $10,000 in their account, are also found to respond to bank risk…. More importantly, we find that the introduction of explicit deposit insurance caused a significant reduction in market discipline…. Moreover, by exploiting the variation in the coverage rate across banks, we find that the effect of deposit insurance on market discipline depends on the coverage rate. The higher the coverage rate, the larger the decrease in market discipline after the introduction of deposit insurance.” [24]
More specific to the point at hand, a 2002 study by Linda Hicks and Kenneth Robinson analyzed Texas bank data from 1919 to 1926, when the state offered deposit insurance, and found that, far from adding stability to the marketplace, deposit insurance increased the likelihood of a bank’s failure. The study found that insured institutions, after experiencing declines in their capital positions, engaged in more risky activities than did uninsured banks. Thus, the moral hazard of deposit insurance made failure even more likely. [25]
In the final analysis, it cannot be argued with any degree of certainty that this last aspect of the Depression-era banking regulations – deposit insurance – was successful in decreasing risk to either depositors or the banking system as a whole. It can, however, be stated with certainty that the moral hazard that results, coupled with the socialization of losses under the “too big to fail” doctrine has cost taxpayers dearly. What’s important to note is that, contrary to the insistence of those who are convinced that chaos is the only alternative to intrusive government regulation, banking regulation demonstrates just how much better the unhindered marketplace is at policing itself and just how far worse government involvement can make things. This is, in fact, the rule – not the exception.
Fabricaphobia and Alphabet Soup [26]
While an examination of banking in the United States shows such a clear, uninterrupted string of one regulatory failure after another, it is, of course, by no means the only such example. There is a whole list of acronyms that amount to a dictionary or regulatory disasters and excesses back over the years – everything from the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) created as a government monopoly to electrify the Tennessee Valley, even though the private sector was already doing exactly that, and still operating more than half a century after that goal was accomplished and its raison d’etre long since ceased to be, to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) rule that required every child to be belted in, which, by raising the cost of air travel, drove people onto the less-safe highways resulting in five to nine more deaths for every child saved, to the now infamous failure of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to respond adequately to Hurricane Katrina. [27]
Banks are certainly not the only businesses to be regulated endlessly by government. Virtually every aspect of enterprise is weighed, measured, scrutinized, restricted and, of course, taxed. If this were not the case, we are told, big business would victimize the general public at every turn. This is why it is necessary to create such agencies as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), without which, companies like Enron, Worldcom, Tyco and Global Crossing could perpetrate fraud….
We have already examined the businessmen-will-starve-the-worker canard in dispensing with the regulatory justification for the minimum wage. Similarly, the notion that any regulation can prevent premeditated fraud is nonsensical. And it may seem counterintuitive to find that I’ve referenced not one, but four, organizations guilty of fraud in making the case against further regulation, but, in reality, a better example of why government regulation is not the answer is hard to come by.
Consider: There are more than 25 million businesses in the United States today (that’s how many paid taxes in 2000) and as many as 20,000 businesses with 500 employees or more. Nearly all of them operate seamlessly without ever running afoul of the law or harming the public. Consider that these figures are for a single point in time. Every year, thousands upon thousands of new business ventures are begun. And every year thousands of businesses are sold, retired or simply fail. So when considering what percentage of businesses is found to engage in unsavory practices over a period of time, it should be remembered that even the 25 million figure is an understatement.
Now examine, in that light, perhaps the largest single business scandal (in terms of economic impact) in history: the 2002-2003 accounting debacle. In all, fewer than forty US companies were implicated in the scandal (there were foreign entities as well – i.e. Parmalat and Ahold, but to include them would mean including all the other foreign business entities in the comparison sample) including the accounting firms that failed to detect the improprieties, companies that were implicated but were never demonstrated to have engaged in any wrongdoing. That’s forty … out of millions. How do you suppose that compares to the number of scandals related to the 435 members of Congress at any given time? Is it reasonable to view this group as more trustworthy? I think not. [28]
Examples of material fraud perpetrated by these companies, as opposed to against them, are, in fact, so rare that, when they do happen, they become part of the national consciousness. The reasons are simple. It is in the best interests of companies to avoid even the appearance of wrongdoing lest they suffer adverse customer reaction in the marketplace and either perform less well or fail altogether. And frauds such as those perpetrated by the companies mentioned cannot remain undetected indefinitely. Sooner or later – more often sooner – such losses cannot be hidden from investors, competitors, creditors and customers, all of whom have a vested interest in paying attention to how the company is performing. Again, the evidence is clear that the marketplace is at least as well equipped as any regulatory body at policing these entities.
In the final analysis, the demise of Enron and Worldcom had, by far, the greatest impact on the American public and on the economy as a whole. Jobs were lost; pensions disappeared; shareholders were stuck with worthless paper while executives unloaded their holdings. While other companies also went into bankruptcy, these two were the largest (and by a wide margin) to be brought down. According to the Brookings Institution, the total economic impact of the Enron and Worldcom scandals was estimated to be in the $37 billion to $42 billion range in the first year assuming that the market did not rebound from levels at the time. [29] At the time of their report, the Dow rested just below 8,200. A year later the Dow had risen to just under 9,100 (having averaged 8,459 over the period). Government estimates and shareholder lawsuits put the total cost at about $65 billion. [30]
The first thing that the government did in response was to prosecute those who were guilty of wrongdoing. This is an entirely appropriate response. After all, fraud was already illegal. Had the response stopped there the damage might have been minimized. But then, the powers that be insisted that Congress do something! What they did was, of course, Sarbanes-Oxley. And it demonstrated everything that is wrong about irresponsible regulation in the United States.
First of all, it was ostensibly designed to prevent the recurrence of actions such as those that took place at Enron and Worldcom, but not only were those actions already illegal, but nothing in the new legislation could in any way prevent deliberate fraud on the part of company management. Second, in an amazing display of legislative incompetence, the new regulations were to be put into effect immediately, but several months went by before any guidance was provided regarding the nature and methodology of compliance. But, worst of all, its cost to the economy was, and still is, several orders of magnitude greater than the cost of the problems it was supposedly designed to prevent.
A year after the legislation was passed, PricewaterhouseCoopers Management Barometer indicated that 58 percent of smaller companies, the key drivers of job creation, found that compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley was “costly”. More than two-thirds of those surveyed indicated that they expected those compliance costs to remain the same or increase over the coming years. Further, executives indicated that some 10.4 percent of their management control budgets were devoted to Sarbanes-Oxley compliance. [31] In fact, according study by Foley & Lardner, LLP, in the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley, average audit fees for small companies soared 96 percent to $1 million in 2004. In the aggregate, that comes to tens of billions of dollars in a single year just for “small companies”. Overall, Foley & Lardner concluded that the cost of being a public company jumped 33 percent in that one year. And a university of Rochester economist examined the overall impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and concluded that. “[t]he loss in market value around the most significant rulemaking events [of Sarbanes-Oxley] amounts to $1.4 trillion”! [32]
So, the failure of business to prevent fraud costs the economy as much as $65 billion and the governmental response costs the economy as much as $1.4 trillion. Tell me again how much better the government is at regulating business than the free market. I must have missed something.
It’s all part of a pattern, really. The insistence that business needs to be heavily regulated typically stems from a condition I call “fabricaphobia” – from the Latin “fabrica” meaning “trade/manufacture/craft” and “phobia” meaning “irrational fear” - fear of business, occasionally even expressed simply: “Business scares me.” Don’t get me wrong. I am not suggesting that you trust anyone on faith. I don’t trust any businessman seeking an audience with Caesar on the Potomac any farther than I could throw them with two unset broken arms. What makes the fear irrational is the concurrent belief that government can accomplish anything besides making matters worse. And, part and parcel of this mindset, is the certainty that only government can hold business abuses in check. The evidence is entirely contrary to that view.
Consider the alphabet soup of agency designed to protect is from business. We have already examined the damage that the Environmental Protection Agency caused with regard to DDT. But was the EPA necessary to protect us all from a rapidly deteriorating environment? The evidence indicates otherwise. In fact, the correlation between the adoption of economic liberty and the cleanliness of the environment is hugely positive. This is why the environment in the United States, with relatively fewer controls has so few problems – the controversial subject of carbon dioxide emissions notwithstanding – while Eastern Europe has only emerged from a layer of soot in the years since the Iron Curtain fell. Siberia remains the world’s largest landfill.
These results are not in the least surprising. A clean environment is what is called a normal good. This means that as economic well-being increases – a direct result of economic liberty – the demand for it increases. But, it is asked, what about supply? Where private property is enforced, this is not a problem. The property owner has a huge vested interest in keeping his own property clean and/or monitoring his property to prevent the infringement upon his rights by others. What problems there are arise in cases where private ownership of resources does not exist. “As Garrett Hardin pointed out in his classic 1968 article ‘The Tragedy of the Commons,’ when no one owns a resource, it will be overused, because no one has an incentive not to overuse it. One obvious solution is to transform, to the extent possible, the commons into private property. This has been done with rivers, lakes and land … turning rivers, for example, into private property, as is done in Scotland. Scotland, not coincidentally, has pristine rivers.” [33]
Then, there’s the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). It was created because, of course, without stringent oversight, businesses cannot be trusted to provide a safe working environment. But is that assertion true? “In fact, employers have many incentives to make workplaces safe. Since the time of Adam Smith, economists have observed that workers demand ‘compensating differentials’ (i.e., wage premiums) for the risks they face. The extra pay for job hazards, in effect, establishes the price employers must pay for an unsafe workplace. Wage premiums paid to U.S. workers for risking injury are huge; they amount to about $245 billion annually (in 2004 dollars), more than 2 percent of the gross domestic product and 5 percent of total wages paid [and that figure does not include the cost of workers’ compensation]. These wage premiums give firms an incentive to invest in job safety because an employer who makes the workplace safer can reduce the wages he pays.
“Employers have a second incentive because they must pay higher premiums for workers’ compensation if accident rates are high. And the threat of lawsuits over products used in the workplace gives sellers of these products another reason to reduce risks…. How well does the safety market work? For it to work well, workers must have some knowledge of the risks they face. And they do. One study of how 496 workers perceived job hazards found that the greater the risk of injury in an industry, the higher the proportion of workers in that industry who saw their job as dangerous.
“Workers on moderately risky blue-collar jobs, whose annual risk of getting killed is 1 in 25,000, earn a premium of $280 per year. The imputed compensation per ‘statistical death’ (25,000 times $280) is therefore $7 million. Even workers such as coal miners and firemen, who are not strongly averse to risk and who have knowingly chosen extremely risky jobs, receive compensation on the order of $1 million per statistical death…. These wage premiums are the amount workers insist on being paid for taking risks—that is, the amount workers would willingly forgo to avoid the risk….”
“Other evidence that the safety market works comes from the decrease in the riskiness of jobs throughout the century. One would predict that, as workers become wealthier, they will be less desperate to earn money and will therefore demand more safety. The historical data show that this is what employees have done and that employers have responded by providing more safety. As per capita disposable income per year rose from $1,085 (in 1970 prices) in 1933 to $3,376 in 1970, death rates on the job dropped from 37 per 100,000 workers to 18 per 100,000….
“Beginning with the passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, the federal government has attempted to augment these safety incentives, primarily by specifying technological standards for workplace design. These government attempts to influence safety decisions formerly made by companies generated substantial controversy and, in some cases, imposed huge costs. A particularly extreme example is the 1987 OSHA formaldehyde standard, which imposed costs of $78 billion for each life that the regulation is expected to save. Because the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that OSHA regulations cannot be subject to a formal cost-benefit test, there is no legal prohibition against regulatory excesses…. Increases in safety from OSHA’s activities have fallen short of expectations. According to some economists’ estimates, OSHA regulations have reduced workplace injuries by, at most, 2–4 percent.” [34]
Some years back, I worked for the domestic arm of a major foreign property/casualty insurance company. As one might expect, insurance companies have some experience addressing workplace safety, so, when OSHA inspectors arrived for a normal inspection, there was little concern that any problems would be found. At the conclusion of the inspection, those expectations were vindicated, or so everyone thought. The company was cited and substantially fined for the improper handing of hazardous materials. That’s a serious infraction. Mishandling of toxic substances ranging from powerful acids to zinc stearate dusts that can be inhaled can place workers at serious, even lethal, risk. The problem: unattended on some office worker’s desk was an open bottle of White-Out correction fluid. This is not to say that every regulatory action results in such overreactions, but the possibility is created by the regulations themselves.
The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) was created in 1972 and regulates no fewer than 15,000 products because, again, without someone looking over their shoulder, businesses would apparently kill off their customers with impunity. The CPSC covers essentially any consumer product not otherwise regulated by some other federal agency such as the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The circumstances surrounding the need/effectiveness of each of these agencies are essentially the same, which is why the activities of the NHTSA are mentioned in this analysis. The high-profile of the FDA warrants additional comment and is addressed below. Certainly, in the absence of such an agency, the consumer would be at serious and continuous risk, right? Don’t be ridiculous.
The CPSC has only been in existence for 36 years. How is it that consumers did not die off in the dark ages before this agency came into being? As in the case of workplace safety, the market already provides huge incentives to companies to provide safe and effective products. Those companies that fail to meet consumer needs – including for safe and effective products – will soon find themselves out of business. There’s no question that unsafe products do occasionally make it to the marketplace but they are by far the exception rather than the rule.
But what should be done to address even the rare case of those products that make it to market because problems were not foreseen by the manufacturer or because there was an undetected problem with the production of certain items or even in the extremely rare instance of unscrupulous individuals not interested in protecting their reputation who try to dump hazardous or useless products on an unsuspecting public? The private sector can’t be relied upon to address this hazard, can it?
Underwriters Laboratories Inc. was founded in 1894 as a private sector means of testing the reliability and safety of consumer products. The A. M. best Co. was founded in 1899 to evaluate for consumers the viability of insurance providers. Consumers Research was begun in 1929. None of these organizations were involved in public policy matters. Their roll was to fill the market demand for information about products and services made available to consumers.
How did that change? A look at the automotive industry gives some insight:
In 1899, when the US population was about 76 million, there were 26 traffic fatalities in this country. [35] Vehicles were assembled by hand – the use of assembly lines in auto manufacture wasn’t introduced until the next year by Ransom Olds (and perfected by some guy named Ford by 1906). No government regulation existed regarding the safety of automobile manufacture. Clearly we were in serious danger.
Fifteen years later, the number of automotive fatalities had risen to 4,468. While that appears to be a huge jump, it is still far smaller than the increase in the number of automobiles on the road. That was the year that Henry Ford introduced the previously unheard of $5/day wage (typical wages at the time were half that) to combat excessive turnover. He somehow managed to offer this in absence of a federal minimum wage. Federal safety guidelines for automobiles were still a quarter century away.
It wasn’t until 1921 that statistics were captured not just on the total number of traffic fatalities but on the total number of vehicle miles traveled (VMT). In that year, there were 13,253 traffic deaths and 55 billion vehicle miles (a fatality rate of 24.09 per 100 million miles traveled – the NHTSA standard). Driving is clearly a tremendously dangerous endeavor. Still no safety regulation had been put in place.
The United States began its love affair with auto safety regulation in 1940 with a law mandating the use of sealed-beam headlights, effectively freezing innovation in headlight technology for four decades. That year, the number of traffic fatalities had risen to 32,914, but the vehicle miles traveled had skyrocketed to 302 billion. In the absence of governmental interference, the fatality rate went from 24.09 to 10.89.
Over the next couple of decades, more and more regulations were implemented in order to “save the American public” from unsafe automobiles. In each case, the new regulation represented not some innovation on the part of government, but the mandatory adoption of some safety feature already developed by the private sector in order to make their products more attractive to customers. The market forces that result in better and safer products were demonstrably working despite the increased level of regulatory interference.
Fast forward to 1965. In the quarter-century since safety regulations had been implemented, the fatality rate was slashed in half, arguably due to factors that had nothing to do with those regulations. While fatalities rose to 47,089, vehicle miles jumped to 888 billion, yielding a fatality rate of 5.30. That, however, just wasn’t good enough. That year, Ralph Nader published Unsafe at Any Speed, a book that made a number of suspect claims about alleged safety weaknesses in American automobiles, particularly in the Corvair.
Chief among the claims was that the Corvair used a swing-axle rear suspension design was inherently dangerous – hence the title. The claim was completely without basis. In reality, several other car manufacturers used the same design including Volkswagen, Mercedes-Benz and Porsche. And General Motors had, in fact, begun using an improved suspension design beginning with its 1964 models – a fact that was readily available to the public before Nader’s book was submitted for publication. Moreover, both NHTSA data and independent tests found that the 1960-1963 Corvair compared favorably to other contemporary cars including the Ford Falcon, Plymouth Valiant, Volkswagen Beetle and Renault Dauphine. That the charges were without basis, as was the case with Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, did not dissuade regulators from using it as an excuse to further expand their interventions.
Charges of over-reaching have plagued the CPSC since its creation. At the outset, the agency issued regulations for bicycles including, for example, a requirement that a white reflector be mounted above the handlebar stem - the ordinary location for a bicycle headlight – that could only be seen by if a motorist’s headlights hit it while the rider was on the wrong side of the road. Detractors of these regulations pointed out that they had, in fact, reduced cycling safety because it interfered with existing safety features (the headlight) and created an additional hazard by encouraging riders to cycle against traffic. More recently, the CPSC has acted against chemical suppliers that might be used to make fireworks. In June of 2003, it sent camouflaged officers armed with M16s to the home of Bob Lazar and Joy White, who owned a scientific supply company that catered to the needs of amateur scientists, students, teachers, and law enforcement professionals. Authorities were not looking for the next Osama bin Laden or Timothy McVeigh; they were concerned “that Lazar and White were selling what amounted to kits for making M-80s, cherry bombs, and other prohibited items; such kits are banned by the CPSC under the Federal Hazardous Substances Act.” [36]
Of course, sometimes inferior or defective products do make it to market. In March of 2007, for example, Menu Foods, Inc. recalled dog and cat food produced in the preceding three months upon learning that a protein additive supplied by a Chinese company was contaminated.
Recalls are a fact of modern life. Even though millions of Americans will go their entire lives without having had a product they’ve purchased recalled, everyone has certainly heard about them. There are so many different products available to consumers, many of them exhibiting ever increasing levels of complexity, that the chances that all of them will be perfectly and flawlessly designed and produced are simply non-existent. Thus, recalls are a demonstration of the general responsibility and responsiveness of American business as, in the majority of cases, they are undertaken voluntarily by businesses concerned about their customers and their reputation – not, as is all too frequently believed, at the behest of regulatory bodies.
The menu Foods story is a case in point. Pet food companies uniformly test their products on a regular basis. This is why pet food recalls are rare. As one might expect, their testing procedures concentrate on those risks that are most significant and most likely to occur. In this instance, certain wheat and rice protein concentrates were contaminated with melamine. Used in plastics manufacture, this substance has no place in a food product and was never subject to testing. It is simply not possible to test for every hazardous substance in existence. We now know that, while melamine has not been demonstrated to be particularly toxic to humans or dogs, it can cause lethal kidney problems in cats. Pet food companies acted swiftly to get the unsafe products of the shelves often recalling perfectly good product to eliminate even the perception that they would allow pets to remain at risk.
In the fall of 1982, seven people in the Chicago area died mysteriously after taking capsules of Extra Strength Tylenol. It was later determined that someone had taken samples of the product from various stores in the Chicago area, inserted solid cyanide into the capsules and returned the products to the shelves. Long before anyone suspected tampering, however – just a week after the first victim died - Johnson & Johnson, parent company of the pain-reliever manufacturer, issued warnings to hospitals and distributors, halted Tylenol production and advertising and recalled an estimated 31 million bottles of the product – at a retail value of more than $100 million (twice that in today’s dollars).
When it was determined that only capsules were affected, the company volunteered to exchange solid tablet medication for any capsules that were still held by the public. Johnson & Johnson soon leaped to the vanguard of pharmaceutical companies offering products in tamper-resistant packaging. This was not something that was undertaken at the behest of regulators. The company was simply acting in its own interests.
In the wake of the deaths, Tylenol’s share of the pain reliever market collapsed from 35% to a mere eight percent. But because of the company’s swift action, within a year its market share rebounded. In November, just thirteen months after the scare, the company re-issued Tylenol capsules (now in tamper-resistant packaging) and quickly recaptured the distinction of being the most popular over-the-counter pain reliever in the US. Johnson & Johnson reaped the benefits of acting in the public’s interest and, by extension, their own.
No examination of recalls, though, can be undertaken without considering the one most frequently referred to by liberals out to expose the “greed” and indifference of the evil businessman: the Ford Pinto.
The story goes that the powers that be at Ford condemned hundreds to their deaths by failing to recall the Ford Pinto because they had determined that it was cheaper to defend the lawsuits than to recall the cars. They found that it would cost $121 million to perform the repairs and only $50 million to settle the lawsuits according to a memo revealed by Mother Jones. The incident was used as a basis for the film Class Action in 1991. It is also complete nonsense.
The document which Mother Jones grossly misrepresented was not about the Pinto, was not related to the vulnerability of the gas tank, was not an internal document, and had nothing to do with an assessment of tort liability. In fact, it was part of a response to the NHTSA regarding the potential cost of a new standard (on vehicle rollovers) to the automotive industry as a whole. The calculation of the value of human life at $200,000 was not some morbid assertion by Ford or an assessment of tort liability but was a figure from an NHTSA study in 1972 to determine the “social cost” of accidents. The document was ruled inadmissible in litigation against Ford because it was irrelevant to the issues at trial.
In reality, the Ford Pinto was no more likely to burst into flame than other cars, just as, again, the Corvair was no less safe than comparable vehicles in 1965. It was but one of several cars with behind-the-axle fuel tanks. And over 2 million Pinto’s were produced with the characteristics subject to recall, but only 27 people ever died in Pinto fires (Mother Jones argued, “conservative estimates Pinto crashes have caused 500 burn deaths”), indicating it was no more fire-prone than other vehicles of the time. Moreover, accident fatality rates were actually higher in a number of comparably sized automobiles.
Again and again, the story is the same. The perceived need for intervention is based on misperceptions, failed premises, popular mythology and outright distortions while examples of regulatory failure are legion.
One more example of the alphabet soup remains for this analysis: the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Wouldn’t we all be subject to the quackery of snake oil salesmen if not for this benevolent agency that ensures the food we eat and the drugs we take are safe? Hasn’t it saved millions of American lives? As must be abundantly clear at this point, the answer is a resounding “no”.
Interestingly, the example of “snake oil” is the perfect metaphor for the perceptions of FDA effectiveness. Snake oil has come to mean any medicine or treatment that is either quackish, ineffective or an outright fraud. The irony is that, the original “snake oil” was none of these things and was ridiculed by purveyors of patent medicines at the time many of which were … quackish, ineffective or an outright fraud. Snake oil, still available in China and in traditional Chinese medicine shops in the US today, was sold as a very specific treatment for pain and inflammation. Oils and fatty tissues in snakes contain relatively high concentrations of the omega-3 fatty acid EPA (eicosapentaenoic acid. According to the National Institutes of Health, “[r]esearch has shown that omega-3 fatty acids help reduce inflammation [and] their anti-inflammatory effects may help protect against heart disease…. Evidence from several studies has suggested that amounts of DHA and EPA … lowers triglycerides, slows the buildup of atherosclerotic plaques (‘hardening of the arteries’), lowers blood pressure slightly, as well as reduces the risk of death, heart attack, dangerous abnormal heart rhythms, and strokes in people with known heart disease.” [37] The FDA has been sold as an unqualified benefit to society. In that context, its performance does not even match that of snake oil.
The FDA was created in June 1906 in the wake of public reaction to Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle. Sinclair, an avowed socialist and muckracking journalist living on a stipend from the socialist newspaper An Appeal to Reason intended the novel as an indictment of poverty, working conditions and the lack of a social safety net. Instead, the imagery of workers falling into rendering tanks and being ground into “Durham's Pure Leaf Lard" created a panic about food safety. As Sinclair would later admit, the scene was entirely fictional and he did no real research into working conditions in the meat-packing industry. Efforts of people in the industry to disseminate the truth, however, were either treated with suspicion or ignored outright. Still, people today unknowingly cite The Jungle as a portrait of real conditions before the FDA came into being. The tradition of relying on poor science or outright fiction as a basis for regulation had now begun.
Accutane, Avonex, Baycol, Celebrex, Crestor, Exanta, Iressa, Ketek, Merisia, Serevent, Seroxat, Strattera, TGN 1412, Tysbari, Vioxx. The list of drugs that have passed FDA scrutiny only to have been subsequently found to present serious problems to users is unbelievably long, but that really is not a useful indictment of the agency. Some of these drugs are still on the market. Some have returned as effective treatments while controls are in place to prevent the types of problems that occurred in the past. And some were removed from the market for risks so negligible as to be hardly considered problematic. Vioxx, for example, was voluntarily removed from shelves in 2004 – yet another example of a company acting without regulatory mandate to protect its reputation – when it was reported that it might increase the risk of heart attacks among users. But the correlation was so low (0.4 percent of users affected) that medical boards in both Canada and the United States have recommended its return because the benefit to patients often outweighs the risk. Of eight liability actions initiated against Merck, the drugs manufacturer, two were won by the manufacturer, one was dismissed, one was postponed after it was discovered that the plaintiff had falsified evidence, one ended in a hung jury (8-1 in favor of Merck), one had a split verdict, and two were lost, including the case of a 71 year old smoker who had a fatal heart attack after taking a one week sample pack (even though medical studies indicated that the adverse reactions did not appear until after a full month’s usage). The losses are, understandably, under appeal.
The point is not that the FDA has been a failure because these and countless other drugs have slipped through the cracks of regulatory scrutiny. The problems of each of these drugs were also missed by the research protocols of the manufacturers and independent testing labs routinely used by the pharmaceutical industry to ensure the safety of their products. The point is that there is no evidence whatsoever that the federal government is any more capable than private researchers at ensuring the safety of the food and medicine supply. The costs of regulatory failure on this front come in entirely different area.
Perhaps John Stossel put it best in 2005 when he wrote, “Getting a new drug approved now takes 12 to 15 years. It takes that long because the FDA wants to be extra sure every drug is safe and effective. That seems reasonable. But this vigilant pursuit of safety also kills people.
“Some years ago, the FDA held a news conference and proudly announced, "This new heart drug we're approving will save 14,000 American lives a year!" No one stood up at the press conference to ask, "Doesn't this mean you killed 14,000 people last year -- and the year before -- by keeping it off the market?" Reporters don't think that way, but the FDA's announcement did mean that. Thousands will die this year while other therapies wait for approval.” [38]
A Professor Scammington – a possible alias – puts it in “The Simpleton’s Guide”: “The agency determines which medicines we can buy ourselves, which require a prescription from a doctor and which cannot be sold to anyone. Before the FDA makes a decision on whether to allow a new drug to be sold, the agency requires a long series of tests…. Unfortunately these tests tend to be very lengthy and expensive. A new drug can take several years to go through the entire process. Some of these tests would have been carried out by drug companies even without FDA oversight. Others, however, would not.
“When those tests are completed, FDA begins to review them. It’s here the FDA can make two types of mistakes. If the FDA approves a drug that later turns out to have unexpected risks, people will suffer. On the other hand, if FDA delays a badly needed drug, people will also suffer. From a medical standpoint, the two mistakes are similar. But from a political standpoint, there’s a huge difference. If FDA mistakenly approves a drug, the victim’s stories will often be front page news and the agency itself will be in huge trouble. On the other hand, if FDA mistakenly delays a badly needed drug, hardly anyone will ever know about the suffering caused by the delay. For this reason, FDA tends to be overcautious in approving new therapies.
“Now, caution may sound like a good thing, but if you’re drowning and some bureaucrat demands to see the paperwork for the life-rope that I’m about to throw you, you’ll probably be dead by the time I get his okay. In short, for many people FDA’s caution really amounts to deadly over-caution….
“[T]he basic question we should ask whenever we hear that FDA has approved a new lifesaving drug: If the drug will start saving lives tomorrow, how many people dies yesterday waiting for the FDA to act. The answer, quite simply, is too many.” [39]
So far we have only scratched the surface. There are countless other examples of misguided regulatory intervention that has caused more harm than good – rent control, licensure requirements, etc., some of which will be enlarged upon as we continue to examine the “government is good” position. Still, the point has been made that, like the social safety net covered in the last chapter, the regulatory “pillar” of the modern democratic state is fundamentally flawed. And the anti-government arguments against these pillars are thoroughly justified.
[1] Electronic Code of Federal Regulations (e-CFR), Title 7: Agriculture, Part 1160: Fluid Milk Promotion Program, as of November 14, 2008; retrieved November 18, 2008: http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=ecfr;rgn=div5;view=text;node=7%3A9.1.1.1.22;idno=7;sid=f48f430c7dd5f7c1c1aa866b43534ff7;cc=ecfr.
[2] “Why So Many Laws?”, Legal Ethics and Reform, accessed November 18, 2008: http://www.legalethicsandreform.com/hm_pg22.html.
[3] Salary.com salary wizard, part of CNNMoney.com, accessed November 18, 2008: http://swz.salary.com/salarywizard/layouthtmls/swzl_compresult_national_HS08000274.html.
[4] An examination of the fractional reserve banking system is worthwhile but beyond the scope of this analysis. Those interested in more on that topic should consider Murray Rothbard’s What Has Government Done to Our Money?, 1980: http://mises.org/money.asp and The Mystery of Banking, 1983: http://mises.org/Books/mysteryofbanking.pdf; Ludwig von Mises’ The Theory of Money and Credit, 1912: http://mises.org/books/Theory_Money_Credit/Contents.aspx; and Hans Herman Hoppe’s “The Devolution of Money and Credit”: http://mises.org/journals/rae/pdf/RAE7_2_3.pdf.
[5] Jim Powell, FDR’s Folly: How Roosevelt’s New Deal Prolonged the Great Depression (Three Rivers Press, New York, New York, 2003), p. 31.
[6] Margit von Mises, My Years with Ludwig von Mises. Arlington House, (1976) p.31.
[7] Austrian Institute of Economic Research Report. February 1929.
[8] All CD rates referenced are from: EconoMagic.com Economic Time Series Page: Series Title: 1-month CDs (secondary market): http://www.economagic.com/em-cgi/data.exe/fedbog/cd1m.
[9] Federal Reserve Bank of Boston: Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980: http://www.bos.frb.org/about/pubs/deposito.pdf.
[10] Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation: FDIC, Law, Regulations, Related Acts: Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982: http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/8000-4100.html.
[11] Ronald Reagan, “Remarks on Signing the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982” October 15, 1982: http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/101582b.htm.
[12] Leibold, Arthur. "Some Hope for the Future After a Failed National Policy for Thrifts" in Barth, James et al. The Savings and Loan Crisis: Lessons from a Regulatory Failure, (2004) p. 59.
[15] Susan E. Kennedy, The Banking Crisis of 1933. University of Kentucky Press, 1973. p. 1-5.
[16] Edward J. Kelly, III. Deregulating Wall Street: Commercial Bank Penetration of the Corporate Securities Market, p. 53.
[17] Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act: http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ102.106.
[18] Economists Robert B. Ekelund and Mark Thornton have argued persuasively that the Act amounted to “corporate welfare for financial institutions and a moral hazard that will make taxpayers pay dearly”, but I disagree – not with their analysis of the effect (though with the Fed infusion of liquidity, I think it likely that the markets would have found ways to create financial instruments whether the vestiges of Glass-Steagall remained or not) but rather with their placement of blame. As they concede, the Act would have made “perfect sense in a world regulated by a gold standard, 100% reserve banking, and no FDIC deposit insurance [which is the next topic in the analysis]”. I would argue that the appropriate response is to suggest that the underlying cause be addressed - as the authors have done repeatedly – and place the blame there, and on the repeated governmental socialization of losses in the financial services industry, rather than placing it on the repeal of another governmental interference measure that was not designed to address the problems of fiat money, fractional reserve banking, deposit insurance, but provided protection against moral hazard on an essentially incidental basis. Their take can be found here: “More Awful Truths About Republicans”, The Ludwig von Mises Institute: http://mises.org/story/3098. While I disagree with their take on that one particular point, their analysis on the whole is insightful, on point and alarmingly accurate. From either viewpoint, it remains an example of regulatory failure.
[19] John R.Walter “Depression-Era Bank Failures: The Great Contagion or the Great Shakeout?”, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly, Volume 91/1, Winter 2005: http://www.unc.edu/~salemi/Econ423/Depression_Era_Bank_Failures.pdf.
[20] John R.Walter “Depression-Era Bank Failures: The Great Contagion or the Great Shakeout?”, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly, Volume 91/1, Winter 2005: http://www.unc.edu/~salemi/Econ423/Depression_Era_Bank_Failures.pdf. The paper cites further research: Calomiris, CharlesW., and Joseph R. Mason. 1997. “Contagion and Bank Failures During the Great Depression: The June 1932 Chicago Banking Panic.” American Economic Review 87 (December): 863–83 and Benston, George J., and George G. Kaufman. 1995. “Is the Banking and Payments System Fragile?” Journal of Financial Services Research
9: 209–40.
[21] George R. Kaufman, “Bank Runs”, The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics: http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/BankRuns.html.
[22] John H. Wood, "Review of Elmus Wicker, The Banking Panics of the Great Depression." EH.Net Economic History Services, May 28 1997. URL: http://eh.net/bookreviews/library/0028.
[23] I make it a point not to reveal the identity of the institution for which I work as the opinions and research work I perform is entirely my own. Were I not convinced that this level of increase in premiums is not isolated to this one institution but is impacting the rest of the industry in a like manner, I would have been hesitant to reveal even this much. As this is, therefore, an un-sourced anecdote, it is provided for illustrative purposes only and is not used as the basis for any analytical conclusions.
[24] Vasso P. Ioannidou and Jan de Dreu. Tilburg University Discussion Paper No. 2006–05, “The Impact of Explicit Deposit Insurance on Market Discipline”, January 2006: http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=53872. This article appeared in slightly different forms in “Proceedings”, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue May, pages 124-139 (2005) and DNB Working Papers 089, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department (2006).
[25] Linda M. Hooks and Kenneth J. Robinson. ”Deposit Insurance and Moral Hazard: Evidence from Texas Banking in the 1920s”. Journal of Economic History 62, no. 3:833–53. (2002).
[26] Much of this section, and to a lesser extent the section above, appeared in substantially different form in a series of columns I wrote some time ago: http://fletchforfreedom.blogtownhall.com/2007/05/14/do_you_recall.thtml, http://fletchforfreedom.blogtownhall.com/2007/05/16/enrons_and_tycos_and_worldcoms_-_oh_my!.thtml, http://fletchforfreedom.blogtownhall.com/2007/05/18/the_consumer_advocacy_fraud.thtml. The first article in the series was the last one written before a number of columns were purged and wil be republished after this chapter is completed.
[27] The response to Hurricane Katrina, like the history of bank regulation provides a good example of another problem that arises in any discussion of regulatory failures: partisanship. All too often, it is believed that if only the “other” party were in charge that the failure would not have occurred. Given actual history, this amounts to nothing more than self-delusion. Regulatory agencies fare no better under the auspices of any given party. As we have seen, regulations have failed spectacularly under the administrations of both the major parties. The pretense that is a Democrat or Republican problem is entirely without basis.
[28] Wikipedia, “Political scandals of the United States”, retrieved November 29, 2008: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_scandals_of_the_United_States.
[29] Carol Graham, Robert E. Litan and Sandip Sukhtankar, “The Bigger They Are, The Harder They Fall: An Estimate of the Costs of the Crisis in Corporate Governance” The Brookings Institution, July 22, 2002: http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2002/0722corporategovernance_graham.aspx.
[30] “Group seeks Sarbanes-Oxley changes”, WFAA, November 30, 2006: http://www.wfaa.com/sharedcontent/dws/bus/stories/120106dnbussarbox.c23bb3.html.
[31] SmatPros Editorial Staff, “Execs Don't Agree on the Cost of Sarbanes-Oxley Compliance”, SmartPros, July 3, 2003: http://www.pro2net.com/x39489.xml.
[32] Ivy Xiying Zhang, “Economic Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002”, University of Rochester, February 2005: http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/accounting/docs/speaker_papers/spring2005/Zhang_Ivy_Economic_Consequences_of_S_O.pdf.
[33] David R. Henderon, “Are We Ailing From Too Much Deregulation?”, Cato Policy Report, Vol. XXX, No. 6, November/December 2008.
[34] W. Kip Viscusi, Job Safety, The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, retrieved November 30, 2008: http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/JobSafety.html.
[35] All traffic fatality data comes from the “Motor Vehicle Traffic Fatalities & Fatality Rate: 1899-2003”: http://www.saferoads.org/federal/2004/TrafficFatalities1899-2003.pdf.
[36] Steve Silberman, “Don’t Try This at Home”, Wired Issue 14.06, June 2006: http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.06/chemistry.html?pg=1&topic=chemistry&topic_set=.
[37] NIH Medline Plus. "MedlinePlus Herbs and Supplements: Omega-3 fatty acids, fish oil, alpha-linolenic acid". Retrieved on November 30, 2006: http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/druginfo/natural/patient-fishoil.html.
[38] John Stossel, “Protecting us from the good things?’ Creators’ Syndicate, June 1, 2005, retrieved from Townhall.com: http://townhall.com/columnists/JohnStossel/2005/06/01/protecting_us_from_the_good_things.
[39] Professor Scammington, “The Simpleton’s Guide”, Youtube.com, retrieved November 30, 2008: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ICqAK9tRmok. I do not present the good professor as a reputable primary source, Youtube, not exactly meeting the criteria of a respected research journal. That said, the points made are logically sound, consistent with the factual evidence and presented in an entertaining fashion.